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The World is a Garden:   
 
Nomos, Sovereignty and the (Contested) Ordering of Life 
Traditional approaches to questions about the nomos in IR typically focus upon either its 
establishment and the formal structures that emerge through interaction within a clearly 
delineated spatial area, or an exploration of US hegemony in the post 2003 world. In this 
article I posit a different approach, building on the ideas of Giorgio Agamben, which grounds 
the nomos as a spatialisation of the exception within conditions of neoliberal modernity. I 
suggest that within the global nomos are more localized nomoi that are operate within the 
global nomos. These localized nomoi are a consequence of the spatialization of the 
exception and a fundamental tension between localization and ordering.  
I argue that whilst sovereign power has been a source of contemporary scholarship, such 
explorations have paid scant attention to the regulatory power of normative values and 
their capacity to create order within space. Such norms allow for a greater awareness of 
how sovereign power can be mobilised in and of itself as a form of contestation. Locating 
such debates in the Middle East, I explore the concept of the nomos to understand how 
struggle over the localisation and ordering of space helps us to better understand 
contemporary political life  
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In The Nomos of the Earth Carl Schmitt argued that the end of the First World War 
had a dramatic impact on the organisation of life across Europe, facilitating the 
collapse of the Ius Europaeum Publicum which had regulated life since the 17th 
century.1 Since then, a growing number of scholars have engaged with questions 
                                                        
1 Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth: in the International Law of the Jus Publicum 
Europaeum (Telos Press, 2003) 
about the nature of spatial ordering, whilst also using the concept of nomos in 
explorations of sovereign power. A discussion about sovereignty and the state of 
exception – a legal-political concept that is central to contemporary efforts to retain 
power – contains implicit within a number of assumptions about space and the 
relationship between legal structures and territory. Typically, this work focuses upon 
the exception and the mechanisms of control used to regulate life, yet such 
approaches fail to adequately account for the complexity of political life in the post-
colonial world and the myriad often competing visions of ordering that challenge 
sovereign power.  
 
The concept of nomos is inextricably linked – semantically and politically – to notions 
of law and the ordering of life. For Giorgio Agamben, the convergence of democracy 
and totalitarianism through the state of exception and the resulting camp is the 
“nomos of the modern”, as a consequence of the production of ‘bare life’ across 
society through the proliferation of the logic of the camp.2 While the concept was 
traditionally understood as custom or law, it has become understood in myriad ways 
driven by the political, social, legal and normative contexts and conditions of the 
prescriber. Fundamentally, nomos allows us to speak of a law that “frames, locates 
and organises human, political and social existence”.3 It is a concept that is central to 
order, life and the norms that regulate existence. It is seen by some as a form of 
“root order”, 4 yet as I shall endeavour to show, nomos should instead be viewed as 
the struggle over the localisation (Ortung) and ordering (Ordnung) of space. Nomos 
is thus comprised of the interaction of sovereign power and community within and 
across space. 
 
In this article I seek to demonstrate how using the concept of nomos helps us better 
understand political life in the Middle East through understanding tension between 
competing visions of political order. Across the following pages I propose an 
understanding of nomos that complements the structural approach of Giorgio 
Agamben with a relational approach similar to those proposed by Hannah Arendt, 
Peter Berger and Robert Cover. Drawing on examples from the region, namely the 
construction of the state of Israel and the emergence of geo-sectarian politics, I use 
the concept to understand how struggle over the localisation and ordering of space 
helps us to better understand contemporary political life. I argue that amidst 
contestation over the means through which order is achieved, an existential threat 
to the very nature of the territorially grounded sovereign state arises which can be 
manipulated by forces seeking to destabilize political order.  
Sovereignty, Nomos and Spatial Ordering 
 
                                                        
2 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford University Press, 
1998), 1998 p166 
3 Julia H. Chryssostalis, 2013. Reading Arendt ‘reading’ Schmitt: reading nomos otherwise? 
in: Maria Drakopoulou, (ed.) Feminist encounters with legal philosophy Abingdon, Oxon 
Routledge. p, p162 
4 Martin Ostwald,  Nomos and the Beginnings of Athenian Democracy (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press,1969), 20 
The ability to define the exception - and suspend the rule - is seen to be the 
dominant characteristic of contemporary sovereign power, emerging from the work 
of Carl Schmitt.5 Although deeply problematic, Schmitt’s work has been taken up by 
scholars on both left and right – as an influential voice in neo-conservative thought 
and a powerful voice against liberal imperialism - offering insight into International 
Legal and Political Theory, yet his work has also had a large impact on International 
Relations, particularly evident in his work on sovereignty and nomos. Schmitt’s ideas 
are predicated upon a reading of the political as one that is based upon the 
friend/enemy distinction, which creates a particular form of political and social 
organisation.  
 
Schmitt’s later work moved away from an interest in domestic affairs and took on an 
international focus underpinned by spatial concerns. Perhaps the most influential of 
this period of work is Der Nomos der Erde, (The Nomos of the Earth,) in which 
Schmitt focusses upon the apparent failure of the Ius Publicum Europaeum and the 
emergence of a new nomos. For Schmitt, nomos stems from the unity of space and 
law, driven by the complex interaction of Ortung and Ordnung, which create spatial 
limits through taking an outside.6 This approach creates a particular form of legal 
and political life, wherein conflict is an inherent and daily part of life as the political 
underpins all interactions.7 Ultimately, the earth “becomes a battleground, and the 
polity a vessel for conflict”.8 
 
For Schmitt, nomos is essential in rooting law to land, where appropriation is a 
fundamental act, restoring law’s ‘spatial character’. It is, “the original spatial order, 
the source of all further concrete order and further law. It is the reproductive root in 
the normative order of history.”9 In The Nomos of the Earth, “land appropriation is 
the primeval law-founding act” 10 a concept that takes us back to the beginning of 
political life, naming “the originary and primordial relation of law to the earth and to 
the soil” .11 Schmitt’s engagement with the concept of nomos is typically understood 
as an attempt to understand world order and has prominently featured in academic 
debates about US hegemony in the post 9/11 context. 12 Yet as Hannah Arendt 
                                                        
5 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology. Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005). This concept is deeply problematic, removing all forms of 
agency and contingency, yet it is beyond the scope of the paper to address this in detail 
here.  
6 Agamben, 1998 p19 
7 Criticism of the Schmittian understanding of ‘the political’ is well known and is beyond the 
scope of this article to set out.  
8 Anna Jurkevics, ‘Hannah Arendt reads Carl Schmitt’s The Nomos of the Earth: A dialogue on 
law and geopolitics from the margins’, European Journal of Political Theory, 16:3 (2017), 
p349. 
9 Schmitt, 2003 p42   
10 Ibid. p47 
11 Chryssostalis, 2013 p172 
12 See: Roland Axtmann,  ‘Humanity or Enmity? Carl Scmitt on International Politics’, 
International Politics 44 (2007) 531-51. William Hooker, Carl Schmitt’s International Thought 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).  
suggests – and as we shall explore in due course – this understanding of Law ignores 
inter-subjectivity and processes of interpretation. Moreover, it removes all traces of 
normative legal and political characteristics which offer an alternative ordering of 
life.13   
 
Although problematic, Schmitt’s work continues to shape a number of intellectual 
traditions. For Louiza Odysseos and Fabio Petito, Schmitt’s account of nomos offers 
“the most compelling history of the development of international law”, along with 
an “alternative historical account of international relations […] and demise of 
modern ‘international society’, often referred to as the ‘Westphalian system’”.14  For 
others, Schmitt’s work was central to a powerful critique of liberal world-ordering, 
political geography challenged by the “spaceless universalism” of the Anglo-
American imperial agenda and the “end” of interstate politics.15 Perhaps more 
importantly, Schmitt’s work allowed for a return to the politics of exception, 
particularly that put forward by Agamben, and Hardt and Negri, along with a 
reimagining of figures of ‘the partisan’ and ‘terrorist’ in the post 9/11 world.16  
 
It is the return of this exception that is of interest to our project and, in particular, 
the work of Giorgio Agamben. Building upon both Schmitt and Michel Foucault, 
particularly the decision to “take life or let live”.17  Agamben’s understanding of 
sovereign power is concerned with the regulation of life through exception, which 
                                                                                                                                                              
Stephen Legg, and Alex Vasudevan,  (2011) ‘Introduction: Geographies of the Nomos’, in 
Stephen Legg (ed), Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt: Geographies of the Nomos, 
(London: Routledge) amongst others.  
13 Hannah Arendt, Marginalia, p49, cited in Jurkevics, 2013. 
14  Louiza Odysseos and Fabio Petito (eds) 2007. ‘‘Introduction: the International Political 
Thought of Carl Schmitt.’’ In The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, 
Liberal War and the Crisis of Global Order, edited by L. Odysseos and F. Petito, 1–17. 
London: Routledge. P1 
15 See: Slavoj Zˇizˇek, 1999. ‘‘Carl Schmitt in the Age of Post-Politics.’’ Chantal Mouffe (ed), In 
The Challenge of Carl Schmitt, (London: Verso 1999) 18–37; Peter Stirk Carl Schmitt, Crown 
Jurist of the Third Reich: On Pre-emptive War, Military Occupation and World Empire. 
(Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 2005).  
Kam Shapiro, 2008. Carl Schmitt and the Intensification of Politics. (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers). 
Sergei Prozorov, 2009. ‘‘Generic Universalism in World Politics: Beyond International 
Anarchy and the World State.’’ International Theory 1(2):215–47.  
Gabriella Slomp 2009. Carl Schmitt and the Politics of Hostility, Violence and Terror. London: 
Palgrave.  
16 Andreas Behnke, 2004. ‘‘Terrorising the Political: 9/11 within the Context of the 
Globalisation of Violence.’’ Millennium: Journal of International Studies 33(2):279–312. 
Chantal Mouffe (ed) On the Political London: Routledge 2005, Werner, Wouter. 2010. ‘‘The 
Changing Face of Enmity: Carl Schmitt’s International Theory and the Evolution of the Legal 
Concept of War.’’ International Theory 2(3):351–80.  
17 Michel Foucault, "Governmentality”. In Ideology and Consciousness 6, 5 no.2 (1979) 
Foucault, M. The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality – Volume 1. (London: Penguin, 
1976)  
ultimately becomes the “nomos of the modern”.18  Agamben’s work seeks to 
undertake a spatialization of the exception, driven by a desire to map particular 
“socio-geographical phenomena” where the exception is seen to operate.19 It is 
within these sites that key aspects of Agamben’s work emerge. Here, the ban is 
located, producing bare life through the exclusion of life from the polis and its 
inclusion through exclusion, a theme that will recur later in this essay.20  
For Agamben, the ban is the state of exception; it is the process of creating an 
outside and conversely, an inside. Through this constitutive act, the sphere of the 
political is born 21  along with the “paradox of sovereignty”. 22  This paradox is 
contingent on the idea that the sovereign is 
neither external nor internal to the juridical order, and the problem of defining it 
concerns precisely a threshold, or a zone of indifference, where inside and outside 
do not exclude each other but rather blur with each other. The suspension of the 
norm does not mean its abolition, and the zone of anomie that it establishes is not 
(or at least claims not to be) unrelated to the juridical order.23
 
Put another way, the state of exception is “the preliminary condition for any 
definition of the relation that binds and at the same time abandons the living being 
to the law”.24 It is this inclusive exclusion that is at the heart of much of Agamben’s 
thought, a spatial threshold,  a zone of indistinction through which one can identify 
the structure of political relations and public spaces. From this, we can observe how 
political life and meaning is stripped from individuals, creating hominus sacri in the 
process.  
Central to Agamben’s work is the Aristotelean distinction between life as either bios 
or zoe, wherein life has political meaning or where such meaning has been 
eviscerated, excluded from what is viewed as a qualified political life and subjected 
to sovereign violence. In this position, individuals are simultaneously bound by legal 
structures yet abandoned by them, residing in a position wherein they are subject to 
                                                        
18 Part Three, Chapter 7 of Homo Sacer is entitled ‘The Camp as the ‘Nomos’ of the Modern’. 
19 Oliver Belcher, Lauren Martin, Anna Secor, Stephanie Simon, and Tommy Wilson, 
‘Everywhere and Nowhere: The Exception and the Topological Challenge to Geography’, 
Antipode 40 (2008) p499 
20 Richard Ek,  2006, ‘Giorgio Agamben and the Spatialities of the Camp’, Geografiska 
Annaler Series B: Human Geography 88B (2006) 363-86. Derek Gregory, ‘The Black Flag: 
Guantanamo Bay and the Space of Exception’, Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human 
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Henry, S. ‘Exceptional Sovereignty? Guantanamo Bay and the Re-colonial Present’, Antipode 
39 (2007) 627-48.  
21 Astrid Deuber-Mankwosky, ‘Cutting off Mediation. Agamben as Master Thinker’, Acta 
Poetica 36:1 (2015) p55.  
22 Legg and Vasudevan, 2011 p13. See also: Belcher et al, 2008 p499, Debrix 2009, Minca 
2006, 2007.  
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Agamben, 2005 p23. 
24 Ibid., p23.  
the laws yet not protected by them and can be killed by anyone but not sacrificed.25 
Here, bare life becomes increasingly political through its inclusion, bound in a more 
fundamental political relationship with sovereign power.  
In doing so, we see the mechanisms of sovereign control in operation: 
The sovereign no longer limits himself [...] to deciding on the exception on the basis 
of recognizing a given factual situation (danger to public safety): laying bare the 
inner structure of the ban that characterizes his power, he now de facto produces 
the situation as a consequence of his decision on the exception.26 
The situation referred to above brings about ideas of the camp, a zone of 
indistinction and the space that opens up amidst efforts to grant the unlocalizable a 
“permanent and visible localization”.27 It is a consequence of the fundamental 
ambiguity of the nexus between Ortung and Ordnung that characterises Agamben’s 
nomos.28  
 
For Agamben, the camp is the “hidden matrix of politics”, where all political life is 
captured and regulated by “the governmental machine” that is formed by 
sovereignty, government, law and police.29 It is a spatial form, existing beyond the 
normal juridical and governmental order.30 In Agamben’s thought this is nomos, the 
link between localization and ordering, the immediate form where “the political and 
social order of a people becomes spatially visible”,31 fundamentally, the localization 
of the unlocalisable.32 This idea is a central feature of neo-liberal modernity, 
especially pertinent in the post 9/11 political context, with inherently spatial 
characteristics.33 Accepting this view of the camp brings the formal and informal into 
discussion of sovereignty and the mechanisms of the state.34 The camp is also a site 
of metaphysical potentiality, wherein all may be cast as hominus sacri by virtue of 
this potentiality.35 As Edkins and Pin-Fat suggest: “We have all become homines sacri 
or bare life in the face of a biopolitics that technologizes, administers, and 
                                                        
25 Agamben, 1998. 
26 Ibid., p170  
27 Ibid., p37 
28 Minca, 2006, p390. See also: Bulent Dilken, ‘Zones of indistinction: security, terror and 
bare life’, in Anselm Franke and Kunst-Werke Berlin (eds) Territories. Islands, camps, and 
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29 Agamben, 1998  
30 Ibid. p169 
31 Claudia Aradau, ‘Law Transformed: Guantanamo and ‘the Other Exception’, Third World 
Quarterly 28:3 (2007) p492  
32 Dilken, 2003 
33 See: Legg,  2011; Claudio Minca and Rory Rowan, On Schmitt and Space, (Oxon: Routledge, 
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34 Giorgio Agamben, The Use of Bodies (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016)  
35 Dilken, 2003 
depoliticizes and thereby renders the political and power relations irrelevant”.36 
To illustrate this point, Agamben uses the idea of the wolfman to demonstrate 
spatial transgressions, crossing between the human and non-human realms. Drawing 
upon the figure of the wolfman, the individual who transgresses both law and 
society, appearing to simultaneously occupy the role of both man and beast. For 
Agamben this 
 
is not a piece of animal nature without any relation to law and the city. It is, rather, a 
threshold of indistinction and of passage between animal and man, physis and 
nomos, exclusion and inclusion: the life of the bandit is the life of the loup garou , 
the werewolf, who is precisely neither man nor beast , and who dwells paradoxically 
within both while belonging to neither.37 
Whilst Schmitt and Agamben both offer persuasive accounts of sovereign power, a 
number of challenges emerge. One challenge stems from the idea that consideration 
of legal structures alone cannot account for the regulation of behaviour, highlighted 
by the tale of Antigone. Indeed, as we shall see, a range of factors are in play that 
shape agency, legal structures and the spatial order of the Westphalian system. A 
second challenge concerns the role of agency and the mechanisms through which 
change occurs within both political organisation and bare life. Reading Agamben, it is 
easy to conclude that political life is bleak, with sovereign power extending over 
those with authority over vital human activities and little scope to resist sovereign 
power,38 yet as Edith Szanto and Patricia Owens persuasively argue, this is far from 
accurate: although bare life limits scope for the expression of agency, this does not 
remove it altogether.39 Rather, bare life removes the capacity for political expression 
and representation which, of course, may impact upon expressions of agency but 
does not necessarily do so.  
 
Perhaps the most damning challenge to sovereign power in the post-colonial world 
concerns the remnants of the Westphalian system and its spatial bordering where 
sovereign power plays out amidst competing manifestations of Ortung and Ordnung 
that play out in time and space. Whilst the nation-state has been reified within 
                                                        
36 Jenny Edkins and Veronique Pin-Fat V, ‘Introduction: Life, power, resistance’, in Jenny 
Edkins, Michael Shapiro, and Veronique Pin-Fat (eds), Sovereign Lives: Power in Global 
Politics (New York: Routledge, 2004), p9. 
37 Agamben, 1998, p105  
38 See: Paul Rabinow, & Nikolas Rose, (2006). Biopower today. BioSocieties: An 
Interdisciplinary Journal for the Social Study of the Life Sciences, 1(2), 195–218. Ewa 
Plonowska Ziarek, (2008). Bare life on strike: Notes on the biopolitics of race and gender. 
South Atlantic Quarterly, 107(1), 89–105. Louisa Cadman, (2009). Life and death decision in 
our posthuman(ist) times. Antipode, 41(1), 133– 158. Michalinos Zembylas, ‘Agamben’s 
Theory of Biopower and Immigrants/Refugees/Asylum Seekers: Discourses of Citizenship 
and the Implications For Curriculum Theorizing’, Journal of Curriculum Theorizing 26:2 (2010)  
39 Edith Szanto, Sayyida Zaynab in the State of Exception: Shi’I Sainthood as “Qualified Life” 
in Contemporary Syria”, International Journal of Middle East Studies 44 (2012) 285-299 and 
Patricia Owens, “Reclaiming ‘Bare Life’?: Against Agamben on Refugees.” International 
Relations 23:4 (2009): 567–582. . 
International Relations amidst the organisation of power and knowledge40 - in some 
cases serving to further state interests41 – in recent years a growing number of 
scholars have moved away from the state as the focus of international politics. 42 
From such inquiries, territorial borders are now no longer given, but contested,43 
raising serious questions about the sovereignty of the Westphalian system itself. 44 
Both Agamben and Schmitt recognise the importance of space within discussions of 
sovereign power and, for some, Agamben should be read as a spatial theorist given 
his efforts to localise the unlocalisable.45 Echoing this point, Derek Gregory suggests 
that sites such as Guantanamo Bay must be reconceived, not as “paradigmatic 
spaces of political modernity” but instead as “potential spaces whose realization is 
an occasion for political struggle”.46 Gregory’s observation leads to the assumption 
that the exception also possesses a geopolitical potential.47 Exploring such a view 
prompts greater engagement with the exception, seen as a set of dynamic and fluid 
power relations.48  
 
For Agamben, the sovereign exception is a fundamental localisation whilst the link 
between Ortung and Ordnung serves as nomos of the Earth.49 This link identifies a 
zone of indistinction, a space “excluded from the law” where the state of exception 
“is not external to the nomos but rather, even in its clear delimitation, included in 
the nomos as a moment that is in every sense fundamental”.50 Much like Schmitt, 
Agamben appears to suggest that a previous nomos has broken down to be replaced 
by a new nomos in the process of taking shape, determined by the power of 
international forces.51  Whilst the idea of the camp as the hidden matrix of 
contemporary politics is generally accepted amidst an array of challenges to the 
political, the idea of sovereignty constructed in such a way is predicated upon flawed 
premises. The conceptual groundings provided by Schmitt of clear distinctions 
between Law/Politics, friend/enemy, inside/outside bear little resemblance to 
                                                        
40 John Agnew, ‘The territorial trap: The geographical assumptions of international relations 
theory’, Review of International Political Economy 1(1) 1994. 58-89.and John Agnew, 
Globalization and Sovereignty (Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009). 
41 Neil Smith, American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003) Rachel Woodward, ‘From Military 
Geography to militarism’s geographies: Disciplinary engagements with the geographies of 
militarism and military activities’,  Progress in Human Geography 29(6) 2005 718-740. 
42 Agnew, 1994,  
43John Agnew ‘Sovereign regimes: Territoriality and state authority in contemporary world 
politics’, Annals 95. 2005 437-461. 
44 RBJ Walker, R.J., After the Globe, Before the World (New York: Routledge, 2010) 
45 Minca, 2007  
46 Gregory, 2006, p405 
47 Debrix, F. ‘The Nomos of Exception and the Viruality of Political Space in Schmitt and 
Agamben, Paper presented at the 2009 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, Toronto, 3-7 September (2009). Cited in Legg, 2011 p7 
48 Belcher, et al, 2008  
49 Legg, 2011 p14.  
50 Agamben, 1998, p37.  
51 Legg, 2011 
contemporary political life.52 Neat demarcations that facilitated such an exception 
and the creation of bare life have themselves become zones of indistinction amidst 
the erosion of both territory and the distinction between inside and outside. Here, 
we see how sovereign power is contingent upon the contextual and spatial 
contingency of the political.  
 
Areas of contestation and conflict over spatial reach and nature of sovereign power 
emerge from ambiguous – or contested – sovereignty.53 Amidst such contestation, 
regimes struggle to exert influence within and across borders, creating zones that 
have been conceptualised as enclaves, exclaves and islands; 54 it is hardly surprising 
that a great deal of work has been undertaken on the concept of the border, 
particularly with regard to its enforcement, location and securitization.55 Yet with 
the collapse of demarcations identified earlier requires further exploration of the 
spatial aspects of order. 
 
As Doreen Massey opines in For Space, spatial concepts can be understood in myriad 
ways, yet she suggests that 3 propositions are central: first, space is the product of 
interrelations, of interactions from the global to the “intimately tiny”; second, as a 
sphere of possibility, heterogeneous and multiplicity, which is central to space; and 
third, that space is always under construction.56 This understanding allows for 
different understandings and futures, (re)constructed by changing variables. Such 
propositions map neatly onto the ideas of this article, with regard to a constant set 
of interactions within and between states, affecting the regulation of life and the 
sphere of possibility. Such zones are characterised by indistinction, defined by 
interactions between territoriality and legality, inside and outside, time and space; 
from this definition of the outside, the Ordnung emerges.   
 
In particular moments of time and space, sovereign power clashes with a range of 
contingent factors, allowing for new possibilities to emerge along with new 
manifestations of Ordnung, potentially with spatial repercussions, contesting the 
definition and closure of the outside. For Agamben, the state of exception opens a 
“space devoid of law, a zone of anomie in which all legal determinations – and above 
                                                        
52 Brad Evans, and Michael Hardt, "Barbarians to Savages: Liberal War Inside and 
Out." Theory & Event, 13:3 (2010). 
53 Alison Mountz, ‘Political geography I: Reconfiguring geographies of sovereignty’, Progress 
in Human Geography 37(6)829-841.  
54 See: Stefan Berger, S., ‘The study of enclaves – some introductory remarks’, Geopolitics 
15(2) 2010 312-328; Ghazi-Walid Falah, ‘Dynamics and patterns of the shrinking of Arab 
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Zone Books, 2010); Lucy Budd, Morag Bell, and Adam Warren, ‘Maintaining the sanitary 
border: Air transport liberalization and health security practices at UK regional airports’, 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 36. 2011 268-279. Corey Johnson, Reece 
Jones, Anssi Paasi., et al, ‘Interventions on rethinking ‘the border’ in border studies’, Political 
Geography. 30. 2011. 61-69.   
56 Doreen Massey, For Space (London: Sage, 2005) p9-11. 
all the very distinction between public and private – are deactivated.”57 Yet Massey’s 
understanding of space brings contestation to the fore as recourse to norms, 
narratives and communities of belonging are often evoked, many of which transcend 
demarcated borders and sovereign power itself. Put another way, contestation 
opens the possibility of alternative forms of Ordnung.  
 
Such contingency is easily seen when considering spatial and non-spatial aspects of 
the political in the Middle East, where competing sources of authority from political, 
tribal and religious figures – that easily transcend the moribund internal/external 
dichotomy – challenge the autonomy, legitimacy and capacity of ruling elites to 
regulate life, whilst the power of trans-state movements challenges the territorial 
characteristics of the nation-state. 58 This array of challenges has created instability 
and uncertainty within and between states, once again demonstrating the failings of 
the Westphalian spatial order, stressing the precariousness of the sovereign order. 
Within this political order, rulers derive legitimacy through reference to a range of 
different mechanisms that located state projects within broader ideological, political 
or religious narratives, referred to henceforth as informal structures. Yet as we shall 
see, reference to such projects proves problematic as they also bring division and 
contestation and are not necessarily couched in spatial borders. By consideration of 
alternative orderings, we are better placed to understand the construction of the 
ban and the mechanisms through which sovereign orders are contested.59  
Reflecting on Ordnung  
 
At this stage of our exploration nomos appears concerned with the regulation of 
space, the “hidden matrix of government”, serving as the pre-condition for political 
organisation, yet there is more to the concept that shapes this hidden matrix, 
particularly in the post-colonial world. Fragmented systems of quasi sovereign power 
and authority can be found across political life in the post-colonial word, where 
powerful actors exert influence across space, shaping relationships between states, 
institutions, and populations in the process. Historically, many different forms and 
practices of sovereign power existed in the colonial world, operating under the 
tutelage of the sovereign. The complexity of configurations of sovereign power in 
such societies has given rise to “a complex range of informal sovereignties” which, as 
a consequence, challenge the relationship between Ortung and Ordnung.60 Whilst 
regimes can seek to tame these ‘informal sovereignties’, incorporating them into the 
governmental structures of the state, they have at other times offered serious 
opposition to the state.61  
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(2017) 1782-1799 
59 Ibid.  
60 Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, ‘Sovereignty Revisited’, Annual Review of 
Anthropology 35 (2006) 305 
61 For example, see: Fariba Adelkhah, Being Modern in Iran (New York: Columbia University 
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As Humphey – drawing on Agamben – argues, “localized forms of sovereignty” are 
found “nested” within “higher sovereignties” which “retail a domain within which 
control over life and death is operational”.62 From this, similar claims can be made 
about nomos and nomoi. Whilst the two may coalesce, this is not a necessary feature 
of post-colonial politics. Indeed, tensions between nomos and nomoi – and 
competing interpretations – play an important role in facilitating contestation 
through the legitimisation of competing claims to power. 63 With this in mind, we 
must consider different ways of reflecting on Ordnung which are not necessarily 
directly related to Ortung and, similar to Massey’s argument in For Space, we must 
focus relational aspects.64   
 
To understand this, let us consider the ideas of Hannah Arendt, whose approach 
suggests that nomos emerges through a process of contract-making and the ensuing 
establishment of principles and institutions, through defining the inside by 
demarcating an outside,65 evoking parallels with Agamben’s ideas of sovereign 
power. Arendt’s interpretation of nomos holds it to be related to Ortung is bounded, 
wall like and constitutive of the polis. From this, all laws “first create a space within 
which they are valid, and this space is the world in which we can move in freedom” 66 
creating a bounded space for the interaction of legal structures whilst also 
facilitating stability and permanence. Yet this does not presuppose that nomos is 
foundational or that is possesses an ontological priority; rather, nomos is coeval with 
the foundation of the polis.   
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With this in mind, nomos was originally “identified with boundary line which in 
ancient times was still actually a space, a kind of no man’s land between the private 
and the public, sheltering and protecting both realms while, at the same time, 
separating them from each other”.67  This line is important, allowing for the 
limitation of space through the identification of communal membership. Whilst the 
concept evolved over time, it retained a spatial bordering, from which Arendt 
derived the idea that whilst territory is important, it is the interaction of those within 
a particular territory that meaning is derived. For Arendt, all laws create spaces 
within which they are valid, creating territorial limits of internal order through law. 
In doing so, horizontal legal relationships amongst citizens are created, whilst 
vertical legal relationships are created between citizens and the state. From this, the 
nomos is a space of belonging and of validity, a bounded legal space for a political 
community and for Arendt, those excluded are stateless.  
 
Put another way, “All legislation creates first of all a space in which it is valid, and 
this place is the world in which we can move in freedom. What lies outside this space 
is lawless and properly speaking without a world.” 68 Such a view is metaphysical, 
requiring the necessarily bounded definition of an inside against an outside through 
which the community is able to close itself off as an inside, although as we shall see, 
this does not necessarily coalesce with the sovereign state. 69 Thus, the concept of 
nomos is predicated upon spatial boundaries, the existence of a clearly bounded 
territorial area within which such debates can occur. This position is neatly 
articulated in On Revolution: 
 
Freedom, wherever it has existed as a tangible reality, has always been spatially 
limited. This is especially clear for the greatest and most elementary of all negative 
liberties, the freedom of movement; the borders of national territory or the walls of 
the city-state comprehended and protected a space in which men could move 
freely. Treaties and international guarantees provide an extension of this territorially 
bound freedom for citizens outside their own country, but even under these modern 
conditions the elementary coincidence of freedom and a limited space remains 
manifest. 70  
 
The Arab philosopher Ibn Khaldun, writing 700 years before Arendt, makes similar 
claims about the importance of bounded spatialities: 
1] The world is a garden the fence of which is the dynasty.(*) [2] The dynasty is an 
authority through which life is given to proper behavior. [3] Proper behavior is a 
policy directed by the ruler. [4] The ruler is an institution supported by the soldiers. 
[5] The soldiers are helpers who are maintained by money. [6] Money is sustenance 
brought together by subjects. [7] The subjects are servants who are protected by 
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justice. [8] Justice is something familiar, and through it the world persists. The world 
is a garden...71 
Although different in myriad ways from both Arendt and Schmitt, Khaldun’s 
approach to space and political organisation offers important insight into the idea of 
nomos and regulation, couched in religious belief which depicts a more complex 
form of Ortung, requiring a more considered examination of the role of norms, ideas 
and faith. 
 
With this acceptance of the predominance of normative values, we begin to move 
towards a more nuanced, reading of nomos. As we shall see, however, the act of 
ordering opens up contestation and questions about the authority to impose order 
and the conditions that give rise to its creation. As Arendt acknowledges, the 
omission of the normative from contract making is of paramount importance. Whilst 
not addressed in the above quote, Khaldun populates his conception of the nomos 
with a discussion of religion, which goes some way into resolving some of the 
tensions in the Arendtian approach, although problems over the role of religion in 
shaping nomos that does not coalesce with sovereign borders remain 
underexplored.  
 
Peter Berger’s work on the sociology of religion helps shed light on such aspects and 
the role of religion within society and the power of the community within nomos. 
For Berger, society is a dialectic phenomenon as a product of humanity yet acting 
back upon its creator. Each individual plays a part within this broader and continuous 
dialectic, wherein each individual story is “an episode within the history of society, 
which both precedes and survives it”. 72 With this in mind, Berger argues that the 
dialectic is comprised of three interrelated aspects: externalization, objectivization, 
and internalization.73 Through understanding how such aspects interact, we can 
understand how the world is shaped and, as a consequence, how the world shapes 
agency.  
 
Through this series of interactions, Berger argues that nomos is created. This nomos 
is viewed as an “ordering of experience […] imposed upon the discrete experiences 
and meanings of individuals”,74 a social construction:  
The socially established nomos may thus be understood, perhaps in its most 
important aspect, as a shield against terror. Put differently, the most important 
function of society is nominization. The anthropological presupposition for this is a 
human craving for meaning that appears to have the force of instinct. Men are 
congenitally compelled to impose meaningful order upon reality. This order, how- 
ever, presupposes the social enterprise of ordering world construction. To be 
separated from society exposes the individual to a multiplicity of dangers which he is 
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unable to cope with himself.... The ultimate danger of the individual separation from 
society is meaninglessness. 75  
Although concerned with society, there is nothing that directly relates Ordnung to 
Ortung in this reading of nomos.  
 
Importantly, Berger stresses that the nomos exists simultaneously as both objective 
and subjective, providing scope for a range of different interpretations and 
identities. Thus, the nomos provides an arena for individuals or groups to perform 
their identity in “spaces of appearances”, through both word and deed. It creates an 
opportunity for myriad (often competing) nomoi to emerge, existing within nomos. 
Sharing Berger’s position, in The Human Condition, Arendt argues that the world is 
given meaning through the interaction of people76 achieved through the “sharing of 
words and deeds”.77 The same applies to the ideas of both nomos and polis. Thus, 
“the organisation of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and 
its true space lies between people living together for this purpose, no matter where 
they happen to be […] can find its proper location almost anytime and anywhere” .78   
 
Supporting this position, F.M Cornford suggests that religion and culture help to 
understand the ordering of life. For Cornford, nomos is “a dispensation or system of 
provinces, within which all the activities of a community are parcelled out and 
coordinated”.79  In the Middle East where shared culture and religious belief is found 
across the region. As Hamid Rabi observes, 
cultural heritage (turath) is the means to self-recognition. The national Self is one 
and indivisible. It is the expression of a fixed continuity, in spite of some diverse 
manifestations on the individual and collective levels. Self-recognition cannot spring 
up except from the past. Just as a tree may not be complete without a multiplicity of 
branches, its ability to survive will obtain only as to the depth to which its roots can 
reach.80  
From this, although shared cultural practices transcend state borders and provide 
alternative visions of Ordnung, they can also be harnessed by regimes, built into the 
fabric of a number of states for their regulatory capabilities. In Saudi Arabia, for 
instance, tribal values are reflected in the style of dress and also the channels 
through which political voices are heard, namely the shura council. The importance 
of turath is also found within constructions of legitimacy. Typically this has been 
viewed through an analysis of the performance of institutions, but within the context 
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of rentierism, justice and turath play an important role81 perhaps best seen in the 
role of tribal norms in Saudi Arabia, which simultaneously legitimize and de-
legitimize the ruling Al Saud.82  
The power of cultural practice transcends subjective perceptions and resonates in 
the creation of the state’s formal structures, ultimately shaping the ban and the 
creation of hominus sacri.83 Yet such cultural practices also have the capacity to 
transcend Ortung, having an impact beyond the territorially grounded polis through 
the capacity to propose an alternative form of ordering.  As Raymond Hinnebusch 
argues, the Middle East is characterised by porous borders, both physically and 
ideologically, which poses problems for this construction of the territorially 
grounded nomos, resulting in ideas of community and order spilling out across the 
region.84  
 
As we shall see, ideas that transcend the territorially defined state can result in the 
emergence of a nomos that is not coeval to political spatial boundaries, giving 
individuals the possibility to find meaning – and belonging – in a number of broader 
communities. In The Human Condition, Arendt talks of how “each man is as much an 
inhabitant of the earth as he is an inhabitant of his country”. 85 By extension, we can 
make similar claims about individuals possessing membership of both state and 
broader collective. Three examples are quickly apparent when considering 
memberships in the Middle East: ideas of Arab nationalism, the pan Islamic umma, 
and membership of sectarian collectives. Yet in such claims a tension emerges 
between membership of a territorial form of organisation and the broader collective, 
particularly with regard to the regulation of action.  
 
In the case of pan Islamism, tensions also emerge between the divine and the ruler 
over the sources of sovereign authority in the manifestation of a long-standing claim 
that the separation of religion and politics is denied. For Majid Khadduri,   
 
A distinction […] must be made between an authority which is directly derived from 
and exercised by God, and an authority which is derived from a divine code 
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endowed by God but enforced by His viceregent (or by a secular ruler) which is 
equally binding upon the latter and the people.86 
 
This fundamental tension is central to debate about the relationship between 
religion and politics, made all the more complex in the Middle East as a consequence 
of the emergence of religious groups within the context of particular social, political 
and economic milieu that shaped the regulation of life whilst such regulatory bodies 
often based claims to legitimacy on Islam. In spite of this, the prominence of ijma’ al-
fi’l (consensus) within Islam demonstrates the plurality of positions within Islam with 
regard to politics.87  
 
Political communities are traditionally territorially grounded which, historically 
manifested in the Islamic concepts of dar al-Islam and dar al-harb, terms used to 
identify membership of communities that are territorially grounded, albeit in a fluid 
way and not necessarily representative of the international community of sovereign 
states. Although contested, dar al-Islam is fundamentally understood as “the whole 
territory in which the law of Islam prevails” 88 whilst dar al-harb is the area within 
which Muslims are ruled by a non-Muslim. Parvin and Sommer suggest that it should 
be considered as “a political-territorial expression of that community in which 
Islamic religion is practiced and where it is protected by a Muslim ruler”.89 
 
As Islamic expansion and consolidation met Western colonialism, political 
organisation in the form of the territorial state began to shape Islamic pluralism and 
debate about the relationship between religion, law and politics became dominated 
by questions about obligation and sovereignty. With this, fluid, sociological concepts 
character of Islamic sovereignty became enmeshed within territorially grounded 
political structures.90 The embodiment of Islamic principles within nation states 
helped solidify the sovereign states system, yet membership of a broader 
community remained. 
 
Scholars working on the umma have undertaken a great deal of work understanding 
the construction and mobilization of transnational Muslim identities in the context 
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of globalisation and tension with the sovereign state.91 This body of work seeks to 
consider the construction of a transnational, pan-Islamic community, spanning 
sovereign borders, replete with cultural diversity but often exclusionary. Critical 
reflections on the concept are built upon ideas of Muslims and umma as constitutive 
of localised traditions with discursive claims to a timeless religious community. Such 
expressions occur within a relational capacity, discursive and political.92 It is through 
exploring the way in which often competing communities interact and evolve, 
particularly the tension between concepts that appear dichotomous, that we are 
better placed to understand how political communities – umma and nation 
(amongst others) - are reproduced. 
Ordnung, Nomos and Contestation 
 
To get a more nuanced picture of how life is regulated (and contested) we must 
consider other forms of ordering – and how they interact with Agamben’s vision - 
namely the normative, cultural, historical and social values that help to enforce and 
regulate sovereign power and give meaning to action. Of course, such values are 
context specific, meaning that we cannot talk about one set of Jewish or Islamic 
norms, tribal dynamics or national social practices. Instead, nomos is shaped by the 
range of factors operating amidst the acknowledgement of particular communities.   
 
As we noted earlier, ideas of order are fundamental to the organisation of a 
community, yet as Robert Cover argues, nomos itself is an ordered community: “to 
inhabit a nomos is to know how to live in it”.93 Put another way, 
A legal tradition is hence part and parcel of a complex normative world. The 
tradition includes not only a corpus juris, but also a language and a mythos - 
narratives in which the corpus juris is located by those whose wills act upon it. These 
myths establish the paradigms for behavior. They build relations between the 
normative and the material universe, between the constraints of reality and the 
demands of an ethic. These myths establish a repertoire of moves - a lexicon of 
normative action - that may be combined into meaningful patterns culled from the 
meaningful patterns of the past.94  
Accepting the complexity of such a normative world, comprised of a conflation of 
narratives, creeds and principles, one can then consider them brought together in a 
corpus, which reveals the existence of a transparent, paiedeic nomos. Yet the 
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establishment of nomos is a fleeting instance, where unison brings about its own 
demise. Such commitments establish a fleeting unitary community that is destroyed 
as quickly as it is created amidst the conflation of myriad debates about creed, 
identity and worship, leading to dispute about the nature of the community and 
political project. 
 
Holding such a position entails the acceptance of the plurality of systems of belief, 
meaning and interpretation, resulting in a plethora of different sets of behaviour. 
The richness of this nomos includes paradigmatic materials, acquiescence, 
contradiction and resistance. Thus  
 
Legal precepts and principles are not only demands made upon us by society, the 
people, the sovereign, or God. They are also signs by which each of us 
communicates with others. There is a difference between sleeping late on Sunday 
and refusing the sacraments, between having a snack and desecrating the fast of 
Yom Kippur, between banking a check and refusing to pay your income tax. In each 
case an act signifies something new and powerful when we understand that the act 
is in reference to a norm. It is this characteristic of certain lawbreaking that gives 
rise to special claims for civil disobedients. But the capacity of law to imbue action 
with significance is not limited to resistance or disobedience. Law is a resource in 
signification that enables us to submit, rejoice, struggle, pervert, mock, disgrace, 
humiliate, or dignify95.  
 
Knowing how to live within a particular society requires one to obey the norms 
created through interaction, which hold the normative universe together through 
interpretive commitments some of which are small and private whilst others are 
colossal and public, with some spatially grounded and others not. This structural 
organisation of the nomos, contingent upon commitments and promises, emerges 
with birth itself, as responses to “personal otherness” that are central to the 
definition of the normative world. 96  
 
To know how to live, one must learn those structures that are not necessarily 
codified and thus, the nomos must include a form of education, wherein the 
collective is immersed within the corpus. This direction may be derived from history 
or religion: 
 
For Simeon the Just spoke in the context of his generation in which the Temple 
stood, and Rabbi Simeon ben Gameliel spoke in the context of his generation after 
the destruction of Jerusalem. Rabbi Simeon b. Gamaliel taught that even though the 
temple no longer existed and we no longer have its worship service and even though 
the yoke of our exile prevents us from engaging in Torah and good deeds to the 
extent desirable, nonetheless the [normative] universe continues to exist by virtue 
of these three other things [justice, truth, and peace] which are similar to the first 
three. For there is a difference between the [force needed for the] preservation of 
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that which already exists and the [force needed for the] initial realization of that 
which had not earlier existed at all. 97  
 
Whilst the Torah shapes the normative life for Jews, the normative universe 
established by the interaction of Quran, hadith and sunna shapes contemporary life 
for Muslims, where recourse to justice truth and peace is central. For instance, the 
following two verses of the Quran98 denote this importance: “We have revealed to 
you the scripture with the truth that you may judge between people by what God 
has taught you”; 99 moreover, “the Word of your Lord has been fulfilled in truth and 
in justice. None can change His Words.” 100 Although framed as objective, judgement 
and subjectivity is couched in the engagement with the verses. 
 
We should also stress the importance of darurah (necessity) as a means of justifying 
transgression, taking action away from the righteous path. Within the Quran, 
whoever “is driven by necessity, neither craving nor transgressing, it is no sin for 
him. For Allah is Forgiving, Compassionate.” 101 Building on this, the Surah of Al 
Mai’dah expands on how acts against the Quran can be forgiven; 
 
Forbidden to you for food are carrion, blood, swine-flesh, and that which has been 
dedicated to any other than Allah; that which was strangled; that which was beaten to 
death by a blunt instrument; that which fell a long fall; that which was gored by horns; 
that of which predators have eaten - saving that which you make lawful by slaughtering 
before they die; and that which has been sacrificed to idols. (…) That is corruption. (…) 
Whomever is forced by hunger, not by will, to sin, for him Allah is Forgiving, 
Compassionate. 102 
 
Thus transgression is permitted through recourse to darurah, albeit leading to 
plurality and subjectivity, through interpretation of necessity. From such an 
acknowledgement, we can also see how a range of opposition groups emerge across 
the Middle East – from the very systems they oppose – whose transgressions 
challenge the legitimacy and authority of regimes on the basis of non-compliance 
with religious edicts. Whilst a number of rulers have created links with the ulemma 
as a mechanism through which to cultivate legitimacy and darurah for particular 
actions, such as the seizure of the Grand Mosque. Yet such recourse creates 
plurality, wherein religion serves as a ‘double-edged sword’, simultaneously 
legitimizing and delegitimizing action.103  
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Moving beyond focus on regimes, zones of indistinction that emerge from the 
prominent role of religion within sovereign spaces also provide opportunities for 
voices from the subaltern to challenge patriarchal and hegemonic narratives that 
have previously justified their exclusion. Whilst Asef Bayat suggests that this 
coincides with the retreat of religion from the public sphere, in what he terms ‘post-
Islam’, the idea remains that a space of possibility emerges for those previously 
excluded.104 
 
A fundamental part of Cover’s discussion in Narrative and Nomos explores the idea 
that the law serves to create singularity amongst a multiplicity of normative views.105 
Given the capacity for individuals to derive a plurality of views from nomos, a key 
part of the discussion of sovereignty must also concern efforts to shape, regulate or 
destroy nomos, for it is only through recourse to hegemonic narratives and the 
monopolization of identity, culture, religion and history that a sovereign can fully lay 
claim to the establishment of biopolitical life. Attempts to regulate nomos include 
the establishment of institutions designed to control but being run in accordance 
with legal structures must allow people to express their sentiments.  
 
The civil community embraces everyone living within its area. Its members share no 
common awareness of their relationship to God, and such an awareness cannot be 
an element in the legal system established by the civil community. No appeal can be 
made to the Word of Spirit of God in the running of its affairs. The civil community 
as such is spiritually blind and ignorant. It has neither faith nor love nor hope. It has 
no creed and no gospel. Prayer is not part of its life, and its members are not 
brothers and sisters.106  
 
The shared vision at the heart of nomos simultaneously drives and divides the 
community, as the vision’s creation immediately creates division amongst those who 
debate the very meaning of the community and membership, rendering the 
unification as illusory. Thus, the very creation of unity results in contestation and, 
ultimately, disintegration, from which nomos continues to serve as an arena for the 
interaction of normative structures that regulate life. It is the consistent process of 
tension and reconciliation. Control of the narratives and myths that themselves 
constitute informal structures and feed into nomos are contested yet remain free 
from regulation. Such narratives and myths reveal ideals of community, belonging 
and order, whilst also releasing concepts of resistance and rebellion. Whilst formal 
legal structures are designed as a means of imposing order and power across 
political organisation (and metaphysical nomos) they are not always able to regulate 
nomos. Moreover, informal structures also exist as a source of meaning, providing 
context and justification for political action that may challenge formal structures and 
potentially erode the power of the ban.  
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Whilst our understanding of sovereignty is predominantly concerned with the 
regulation of life through the use of political structures to create zoe, failure to 
understand nomos means that meaning that gives context to action is lost. Within 
nomos, narratives and informal structures set the paradigms for behaviour, through 
the establishment of a “repertoire of norms”, whilst also aiding the closure of a 
community. From this repertoire, paradigms emerge through interaction amongst 
the community and thus, may not be established by regimes. Although traditionally 
taken as coeval with the establishment of the sovereign state, there is nothing that 
precludes the establishment of nomos beyond territorial borders, into new spaces 
and geographies. As Massey argues, space is essentially a site of possibility – akin to 
many of the ideas discussed previously – which provides the capacity for nomos to 
spill beyond Ortung, with repercussions for the ordering of neighbouring states and 
sovereign power.  
 
Complicating this issue is the subjective interpretation of structures, shaped by 
nomos. Although the meaning of legal structures may be agreed upon – in this case, 
the meaning and consequences are understood – the norms that underpinned such 
structures may be rejected. For example, an individual residing in a state may 
understand the meaning of a particular law, but their normative position may result 
in a rejection of the law. Thus, structures that facilitate the regulation of life must 
also be placed within the context of a relationship between vision and norm; put 
another way, to understand political life we must consider the relationship between 
the law, how it is perceived, and the normative environment shaping action. The 
remainder of the article considers how such ideas have shaped political and 
geographical life across the Middle East, beginning with a discussion of spatial 
aspects in Israel before considering the construction of sectarian communities as a 
political tool within the context of the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran.  
 
Transformation and Contesting Sovereign Power 
 
The establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 provides opportunity to reflect on 
how nomos can aid our understanding of political life. In the aftermath of its 
formation, a plethora of competing views and creeds emerged from the myriad 
understandings of Zionism that contested – and thus shaped – the very nature of the 
new state, opening a space between Ordnung and Ortung, stemming from 
competing visions of nomos. After its formation, territory took on an existential 
importance for the nascent state, integral for the very idea of the state of Israel.107 A 
series of conflicts between Arab and Israeli armies transformed the landscape of the 
former mandatory Palestine, including the seizure of large swathes of territory in 
1948, known amongst Arab audiences as the nakba. Although important 
strategically, land possessed a far greater symbolic political and theological 
importance, as groups with competing interpretations of Judaism – and visions of 
political manifestations – struggled to shape the characteristics and definitions of the 
nascent state.  
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After the seizure of the Old City of Jerusalem after the 1967 war one of the first acts 
of the Israeli Defence Forces was to destroy the ‘Moroccan Quarter’ of the city – that 
which sat in front of the Western Wall – to facilitate easier access.108 In the following 
years, architecture and urban planning would take on an existential importance in 
transforming Jerusalem.109 Similar events would transform the landscape of the 
West Bank, as land was divided into Areas A, B and C, before numerous settlements 
were established, laying claim to Palestinian land. In the years after the failure of the 
second intifada, the Old City would undergo increased militarization and the 
installation of a range of security measure to regulate life. An additional signifier was 
the routine use of Stars of David, flown from the rooftops, windows and washing 
lines of houses across the Old City. Transforming land was part of a broader project 
of both Ordnung and Ortung, imposing meaning upon space in accordance with 
meaning derived from the Torah, albeit interpreted in competing ways. 
 
State actors do not possess a monopoly on such transformative acts. Take for 
example, the actions of a number of settler groups – such as Gush Eminim and the 
Hilltop Youth – who in following the teaching of Rabbis Ginsburgh and Kook, rejected 
the legitimacy of the state. For Rabbi Ginsburgh,  
 
the ultimate goal of our yearning is the complete redemption, the arrival of 
Mashiach and the construction of the Temple. There is no doubt that a Jewish state 
is an essential and central component of the grand picture of the redemption of the 
Jewish People. Yet, it is clear that the state that was established...[in](1948), as it 
stands today, is still a far cry from that dreamlike vision that has warmed our hearts 
for almost two thousand years. It is not difficult to understand why many Torah and 
mitzvah observant Jews are reluctant to identify themselves with the state and its 
symbols.110  
In following such proclamations, settler groups began to play a prominent political 
role, seizing land and transforming it in accordance with a particular rabbinical 
vision, opening up competing visions of Ordnung and Ortung, contesting sovereign 
power. 
The transformation and regulation of space is essential in working towards the vision 
of Eretz Israel. Housing played a prominent role in transforming the landscape of the 
West Bank through settlement of civilian communities on Palestinian land. Although 
International Law prohibited civilian presence in occupied territories, members of 
Religious Zionist groups sought to settle civilians across the West Bank to facilitate 
the transformation from ‘enemy territory’ to Jewish homeland.  
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In discussions with Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, the settler group was given 
permission by the Prime Minister to ascend, as he famously pronounced  “well kids, 
if you want to – ascend”.  A different recollection of the quote has it as “Children, 
you may return home”.111 Upon receiving permission, a convoy of cars and lorries set 
off for the hills of the West Bank to establish new settlements and transform 
Palestine towards Eretz Israel.112 Settler groups were keen to proselytize their goals, 
regularly publishing documents detailing their activities. 113 Zvi Slonim, the Secretary 
of Gush Emunim spoke of life in settlements characterised by ““basement” 
conditions yet “penthouse” morale […] the settlement gradually constructed itself as 
a separate entity […] Supporters who came here saw the making of a new form of 
pioneer life […and] were sparked with the seed that fruited with more and more 
Elon Moreh [settlements] in Judea and Samaria.” 114 
For political reasons, the Israeli state later decided to disengage from Gaza and to 
raze a number of unofficial settlements, whilst simultaneously continuing to build 
new homes across the West Bank. The response to disengagement was traumatic for 
many of the settlers. In remembering these events, one settler 
 
burst into tears, telling those present that over the past 80 years of his life, he 
cannot remember a time where thousands of Jewish families were being expelled 
from their homes in such a manner, when 25 Jewish towns were set to be utterly 
destroyed, when the destruction of dozens of synagogues and houses of Torah study 
was to take place, as well as the desecration of Jewish graves.115  
The severity of this response reveals a lot about the varying interpretations of the 
Israeli state building project but also Jewish obligations under the Torah.  
The transformation of territory across Israeli and Palestine was an integral part of 
both political and theological projects, yet the conflation of political laws with 
theological commandments from the Torah reveals the capacity for tensions to 
emerge from nomos and contesting sovereign power. After the establishment of the 
state of Israel – perhaps the fleeting instance discussed earlier – divisions emerged 
within the corpus, creating schisms that would have serious political ramifications in 
the decades to come, both politically and spatially.   
Sectarian Games  
 
As we have seen, nomos is not necessarily territorially grounded and, as such, can 
exist across the spatial borders which characterise contemporary international 
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politics. In recent years, amidst often violent contestation, new geographies emerge, 
driven by the cultivation of nomoi based on shared identities but contingent upon 
the political calculations of dominant actors. In the Middle East, regional rivalries 
seek to capitalize on the possibility of such nomoi, perhaps best seen in the rivalry 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran which plays out across space, driven by competing 
visions of political and religious order, as regional forces interact with the “intimately 
tiny” intricacies of local politics.116  
 
In the immediate aftermath of revolutionary activity in Iran, Saudi Arabia sought to 
erode the nascent Islamic Republic’s legitimacy by framing events through a 
sectarian lens, widening competition between Sunni and Shi’a. The Kingdom’s vast 
petro-dollars provided funding to clerics across the world in return for proselytizing 
the Wahhabist vision of the umma, expanding the Saudi influence and opening up 
new spaces of competition between Riyadh and Tehran. 117  In the years that 
followed, competing visions of Islam and communities of faith emerged, driven by 
sectarian loyalty, (geo)political aspirations and relationships with political projects.118  
 
Amidst this rivalry, sectarian networks have been mobilised in attempt to shape 
regional dynamics and for both Riyadh and Tehran to exert influence beyond their 
sovereign borders. Both states have sought to cultivate networks through recourse 
to membership of a collective nomos, framing and securitizing events as part of a 
broader ‘religious’ struggle.119 Yet to do this requires the presence of a shared 
nomos which provides fertile ground for discourses to find meaning. Consequently, 
membership of nomos – in this case, a community with shared sectarian identity – 
provides opportunities for actors to regulate life through recourse to communal 
membership, transcending territorial borders but not necessarily eroding them, 
leading to a process of (re)negotiation between local contingency and the role of 
states within regional politics.  
 
Recourse to nomos and the closing off of a community has become an increasingly 
common phenomena, particularly amidst the contestation of political projects. In 
Iraq, Syria, Bahrain, Yemen and Lebanon, sectarian communities have been 
constructed and manipulated amidst political and geopolitical struggles through the 
cultivation of sect-based nomoi. The widespread presence of sectarian difference 
across states in the region creates the possibility of competing orderings in pursuit of 
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political and geopolitical power through closing off communities against an 
(external) other.120  
 
In Lebanon, sectarian difference is embedded in a power-sharing political system 
which facilitated the end of a 15 year long civil war. Religious divisions cut across 
socio-economic currents, leaving a complex political situation that has often been a 
site of external interference.121 From such divisions – and reflecting the strategic 
importance of Lebanon in the Middle East122 – Saudi Arabia and Iran have sought to 
capitalize on domestic instability and exert influence over co-sectarian kin at the 
expense of other groups – and their sponsors – across the state. Whilst this has been 
driven by efforts to create cohesion amongst communities, it also involves the 
framing of the other as a threat, best seen in the cultivation of the narrative of the 
‘Shi’a Crescent’, the insidious suggestion that Shi’a groups across the Middle East are 
5th columnists doing the bidding of Iran.123  
 
Communal difference manifests in power-sharing agreement underpinning the 
Lebanese political system but also in the construction of urban life, notably in Beirut. 
The southern suburbs, beyond the Camille Chamoun sports city are predominantly 
Shi’a areas, controlled by Hizballah and whilst Lebanese police patrol the area, they 
are subservient to the Party of God.124 Road names reveal a great deal about the 
area, demonstrating the importance of the group’s leader Hassan Nasrallah, but also 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and other prominent Shi’a figures. Symbols that adorn 
the streets demonstrate this loyalty to the Shi’a – and by extension, Iranian cause – 
from the posters and banners, to the graffiti sprayed across the walls; it is a space of 
Shi’a influence where ideas and beliefs have travelled. Shi’a values, of martyrdom 
and sacrifice are prominent features of such symbolism, revealing a rich normative 
environment that regulates life.125  
 
Iran’s long-standing relationship with Hizballah since its formation in 1982 – 
facilitated by the provision of financial and ideological support – ensures that they 
have a great deal of cultural capital, but it is the existence of a shared normative 
environment that is the real strength of the relationship.126 In the aftermath of the 
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2006 war between Israel and Hizballah which led to the destruction of Dahiyeh – 
Hizballah ‘heartland’ – Iran provided $120 million for post-war reconstruction of 
southern Beirut; in contrast, Saudi Arabia – seeking to get cultural capital through 
provision of financial support to Hizballah, albeit deeply problematic to many in 
Riyadh – provided $1.2 billion.127 In spite of this, it is images of Khomeini that look 
down on anyone walking around Dahiya, suggesting that nomos is a resource far 
more powerful than money with the capacity to shape spatial areas in a way that 
financial resources are unable.  
 
Across the region, similar stories are told, of the cultivation and manipulation of 
sectarian difference for political ends. In Bahrain, a sectarian master-narrative 
framing Shi’a as insidious Iranian agents doing the nefarious bidding of Iran 
decimated the popular protests that took place across 2011, playing on long-
standing fears of Iranian influence – notably the failed (Iranian supported) 1981 coup 
d’etat128 – albeit disregarding the complexity of competing marja’iyya in Qom and 
Najaf.129 In propagating such a narrative, regime officials sought to ensure the 
support of their Sunni citizens amidst a fear of perfidious Iranian interference in 
Bahraini politics. Similar claims are routinely made in Iraq, Yemen and even Saudi 
Arabia.130 Yet national identities remain important, revealing the importance of 
localized contingent factors in the face of seemingly much stronger religious currents 




Fundamental to political projects are efforts to regulate life. This is, as Agemben 
suggests, the ultimate expression of sovereignty: the ability to strip political meaning 
from life and reduce it to bare life. Agamben’s use of the camp adds a spatial 
dimension to sovereign power and the exception, both localised and metaphorical. 
Amidst conditions of neo-liberal modernity, this spatialized exception is referred to 
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as the hidden matrix of modernity, Agamben’s nomos upon which the international 
system of states is built. Yet this view of nomos only goes so far in helping us to 
understand the contemporary nature of political life and sovereign power. 
Possessing both a spatial dimension – Ordnung – and ordering principles – Ortung –
nomos becomes a site of contestation amidst the presence of structures that contest 
the regulation of space, yet our understanding of Ortung requires further 
exploration. Much like Antigone, in contemporary political life sovereign power is 
challenged by ordering that can challenge the localized, spatialized exception. 
Political systems play a prominent role in regulating life, facilitating recourse to a 
state of exception that appears to have permanence yet is contingent upon the 
relationship between Ordnung and Ortung. 
 
As noted, the ban is central to the exception, yet such moves are in many cases 
contingent on the power of informal structures which may facilitate and contest the 
ordering of political life. Legal structures, institutions and the zone of indistinction do 
not exist in a vacuum; rather, they are shaped by conditions and cultural relations 
that are prominent features of political dynamics. How one interprets such 
interactions shapes their behaviour and the performance of their identity. Civil 
society and political space may be regulated and restricted by political elites, the 
ordering and localisation of space serves as a source of possibility.  
 
Although initially grounded within a particular territory, the nature of contemporary 
political organisation sees the development of an array of different forms of 
membership and belonging which defines an inside against an outside, closing off a 
community against the other. Such communities possess their own systems of 
ordering, which may run against the formal mechanisms of state governance 
structures, opening up a space of potentiality. The power of religious norms and 
cultural values often transcends state borders, posing a challenge to the sovereignty 
of a state but also creating new spaces of political life. Here, sovereign power can be 
contested and circumvented from within and beyond as our case studies show. 
 
With such issues in mind, we must bring the normative back into discussion of 
nomos which helps to understand the processes that simultaneously regulate life 
and close a community off against an outside. By bringing the normative back into 
political life we can explore the contingency and complexity of Ortung, revealing not 
only how political order is established but how geopolitical aims can be achieved. 
Fundamentally, however, by focussing on nomos – and the normative environment - 
we are able to glean a better understanding of how life is ordered, regulated and, 
moreover, the way in which sovereign power operates and is contested from within 
and beyond.  
 
